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Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information 
 
Introduction 
Why do firms with long-term projects often borrow on a short-term basis?  One answer from the 
debt maturity literature emphasizes the importance of risk under conditions of asymmetric information.  
Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991), and others provide intuitive models that rely on the volition of low-
risk and high-risk firms with long-term projects choosing different maturities to reduce their financing 
costs or liquidity risks.  Although other theories of debt maturity focus on the roles of agency costs (e.g., 
Myers (1977), Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980)), taxes (e.g., Brick and Ravid (1985), Lewis (1990)), 
and other market imperfections, we concentrate on the role of asymmetric information and how it 
interacts with firm risk.  The importance of debt maturity has also recently been highlighted in the context 
of policy concerns about financial crises and credit availability (e.g., Diamond and Rajan (2001)). 
In this paper, we test the empirical predictions of Flannery’s and Diamond’s theoretical models, 
and further explore the role of asymmetric information in debt maturity choices.  Our data set provides an 
advantageous laboratory for these tasks.  We match the maturities, risk ratings, and other contract terms 
of over 6,000 individual new loans to small businesses in 1997 from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Terms of Bank Lending (STBL) with Call Report data on the 53 large U.S. banks that extend these 
credits.  We also include data from an Atlanta Federal Reserve survey on whether and how these banks 
employ small business credit scoring technology (SBCS), which provides our measure of asymmetric 
information.  Prior research supports the notion that SBCS can be used to reduce informational 
asymmetries (Berger, Frame, and Miller (forthcoming)). 
We perform two main tests based on regressions of loan maturity on the risk rating of the loan, 
use of the SBCS technology, and other bank characteristics and loan contract terms.  In Test 1, we 
examine whether maturity is an upward-sloping function of the risk rating as predicted by Flannery’s 
model versus a nonmonotonic function of the risk rating with the shortest maturities for the lowest and 
highest risk ratings as predicted by Diamond’s model.  We perform Test 1 using only observations for 
banks that do not use the SBCS technology, given that the models predict that the relationships between 
debt maturity and firm risk ratings should be strongest when informational asymmetries are greatest.  In 
Test 2, we examine the effects of reduced informational asymmetries from SBCS on debt maturities for   2   
each different risk rating.  Test 2 allows us to test the implications of the effects of asymmetric 
information in both models, and perhaps more important,  to examine the quantitative importance of 
informational asymmetries in debt maturity generally. A number of empirical papers examine the 
relationship between risk ratings and debt maturity (Test 1), although none to our knowledge examine this 
relationship using only observations for which informational asymmetries are expected to be the greatest. 
Some empirical studies examine the effects of reduced informational asymmetries on debt maturities, but 
none to our knowledge examine these effects by risk ratings (Test 2). 
Notably, our empirical tests are based on bank loans, rather than public debt securities as in the 
theoretical models and most of the empirical literature.  The implications of the models are the same in 
both contexts – to the extent that value is created by maturity choice, it is similarly created whether the 
firm chooses from a menu of contract terms from a bank or from its expectations of market reactions. 
By way of preview, the evidence supports the predictions of Flannery’s and Diamond’s models 
for low-risk firms – maturity is an upward sloping function of risk ratings (Test 1) and a reduction in 
informational asymmetries is associated with increased maturities (Test 2) for these firms.
1  These 
findings for low-risk firms are also consistent with most of the empirical literature.  However, our 
evidence for high-risk firms conflicts with the predictions of Diamond’s model and with much of the 
extant empirical literature.  The most likely explanation for our difference from the literature for high-risk 
firms may be our use of bank loans rather than publicly issued debt, as banks may be better able than 
public markets to use tools other than short maturities to resolve asymmetric information problems for 
high-risk firms (Berlin and Loeys (1988)).  We do, however, find that the predictions of Diamond’s 
model for high-risk firms appear to hold for one group of small businesses  – those without loan 
commitments – and we offer some possible explanations for this finding. 
Our findings strongly support the quantitative importance of asymmetric information in the debt 
maturity decision.  The results of Test 2 suggest a very substantial increase in average maturity for low-
risk firms when informational asymmetries are lessened.  As well, we find that the results of Test 1 would 
be substantially weakened if it were applied to observations for banks using the SBCS technology.  Both 
findings are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical models.  In Flannery’s and Diamond’s 
models, asymmetric information causes some firms to choose short maturity because they are less likely   3   
than other firms to have problems rolling over their short-term debt either in terms of high interest rates 
(in Flannery’s model) or liquidity risk (in Diamond’s model).  As shown below, reductions in 
informational asymmetries reduce these incentives and increase the average maturity for firms rated as 
low risk. 
Section I of the paper provides the framework for our tests – delineating the intuition behind 
Flannery’s and Diamond’s models, connecting these theoretical models to the data, and motivating the 
empirical tests.  Section II reviews the relevant empirical literature on debt maturity.  Section III outlines 
the empirical tests.  Section IV furnishes information on how the data samples were compiled, and 
Section V discusses the specific variables and their sample statistics.  Section VI supplies the main 
empirical test results, while Section VII describes additional empirical checks.  Section VIII presents 
some conclusions.  The Technical Appendix formalizes our intuition regarding the effects of reduced 
informational asymmetries on debt maturity in Flannery’s and Diamond’s models.   
I. Framework for the tests 
Flannery’s (1986) and Diamond’s (1991) models are closely related in that they both explain why 
risky firms with long-term projects might borrow on a short-term basis in the presence of asymmetric 
information.  However, they differ in important ways and have some distinct empirical predictions.  In 
this section, we briefly describe the intuition underlying these theoretical models and show how they may 
be tested in the same empirical model. 
In both Flannery’s and Diamond’s models, firms have two-period projects about which they have 
private information.  The projects could be financed either using long-term debt – a two-period security – 
or by short-term debt – a succession of two one-period securities.  The longer maturity has a higher 
interest rate, but some firms may still choose it because of anticipated problems in rolling over short-term 
debt.  In Diamond’s model, some firms are not offered the option of long-term debt. 
In Flannery’s model, two types of firms that are initially observationally equivalent both have 
positive net present value (NPV) projects, and also have private information that one type is riskier than 
the other.  At the end of one period, creditors learn whether projects were upgraded or not; firms with 
favorable private information (i.e., low-risk projects) have a higher probability of upgrade than those with 
unfavorable information (i.e., high-risk projects).  At that time, all firms that initially chose short-term   4   
debt must roll it over at a new interest rate and incur additional transactions costs. 
In this model, if transactions costs are sufficiently high, a separating equilibrium may exist in 
which firms with favorable private information issue short-term debt at a relatively low interest rate and 
roll it over, and those with unfavorable private information issue long-term debt at a relatively high rate.  
Firms with unfavorable private information are willing to pay the high rate on long-term debt to avoid 
expected costs in rolling over short-term debt – the transactions costs plus a relatively high probability of 
paying a high rate in the second period.  Firms with favorable private information, in contrast, face a 
lower probability of a high rate in the second period and so are willing to bear the transactions costs to 
obtain the lower rate on short-term debt in the first period.  In equilibrium, creditors can infer some of 
what was initially firm private information and use it in assigning risk ratings – assigning lower risk 
ratings to firms that choose short-term debt and higher risk ratings to those that choose long-term debt.  
As a result, debt maturity is predicted to be positively related to risk ratings.  While we refer to this 
prediction as arising from Flannery’s model, it is also consistent with related signaling models that do not 
rely on the presence of transactions costs (e.g., Kale and Noe (1990), Titman (1992)). 
Diamond’s model differs from Flannery’s in that firms are not initially observationally equivalent 
and not all projects have positive NPVs.  Firms have private information that their projects have positive 
or negative NPV.  Creditors do not observe whether projects have positive or negative NPV, but are able 
to assign initial risk ratings based on other observational differences.  No additional transactions costs are 
required for financing via short-term debt.  As in Flannery’s model, creditors learn whether projects were 
upgraded at the end of one period.  Because some of the projects have negative NPV, creditors may refuse 
to roll over short-term debt at the end of one period, creating liquidity risk for firms with short-term debt. 
In Diamond’s model, firms with favorable private information (i.e., positive NPV projects) and 
sufficiently low risk ratings may choose short-term debt at relatively low interest rates because of a high 
likelihood of being able to roll over their debt.  Those with favorable private information and intermediate 
risk ratings may choose long-term debt at a higher rate to reduce their greater liquidity risk of being 
unable to roll over short-term debt after one period.  Firms with unfavorable private information (i.e., 
negative NPV projects) and either low or intermediate risk ratings may mimic the actions of firms with 
favorable private information – otherwise, they may be identified by creditors as having negative NPV   5   
projects and be denied credit.  Thus, all firms rated as low-risk borrow short-term and all those rated as 
intermediate-risk borrow long-term, whether their private information is favorable or unfavorable. 
Firms that are initially rated as high-risk in Diamond’s model may be refused the option of long-
term debt because of a high probability of a negative NPV project.  This is consistent with the debt 
contracting literature, in which the most restrictive contract terms are often used with the high-risk 
borrowers under conditions of asymmetric information (e.g., Berlin and Loeys (1988), Berlin and Mester 
(1993), Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell (1993)).  However, if creditors can obtain sufficiently high returns 
from liquidation after the end of the first period, they may offer short-term debt to firms with projects 
rated as high-risk.
   Thus, Diamond’s model predicts debt maturity to be a nonmonotonic function of the 
risk ratings, with firms rated as low-risk and high-risk having short-term debt and firms rated as 
intermediate-risk having long-term debt. 
As discussed above, in Test 1, we examine whether maturity is an upward-sloping function of the 
risk rating as predicted by Flannery’s model versus the nonmonotonic function predicted by Diamond’s 
model.  Thus, we test both theoretical models using the same empirical model.  We argue that the use of 
the risk rating at the time the debt is issued gives appropriate tests of both theories.  In Flannery’s model, 
creditors draw inferences from debt maturity choices, and their risk ratings reflect some of what was 
initially private information of the firms.  In Diamond’s model, creditors’ risk ratings reflect only the 
initial assessments based on observable differences because no private information is revealed by 
maturity choice.  Thus, both theories have testable empirical implications for the relationship between 
maturity and risk ratings at the time the credits are issued when evaluated under their own assumptions. 
As noted earlier, in Test 2, we examine the effects of reduced informational asymmetries from 
SBCS on debt maturities for each different risk rating as predicted by Flannery’s and Diamond’s models 
and further explore the quantitative impact of asymmetric information within the context of these models.  
Both models would predict an increase in average maturity for firms rated as low-risk if informational 
asymmetries are reduced.  In Flannery’s model, this occurs because the benefits to a low-risk firm from 
distinguishing itself via costly signaling from riskier firms are lessened as transparency is improved.  That 
is, low-risk firms need not bear the transactions costs of rolling over short-term debt if they are no longer 
in danger of being pooled with high-risk firms.  In Diamond’s model, the removal of asymmetric   6   
information would turn some firms into transparent, low-risk firms with positive NPV projects and others 
into transparent, high-risk firms with negative NPV projects.  The former set of firms should be 
indifferent to short-term versus long-term debt, since the liquidity risk issue is resolved.  Assuming that 
some choose long-term debt, the average maturity for low-risk firms would increase relative to the case of 
asymmetric information in which all firms rated as low-risk choose short-term debt.  The latter set of 
firms that are revealed to have negative NPV projects would be denied credit and so would have no effect 
on the observed relationship between maturity and risk ratings. 
Test 2 also addresses a potential shortcoming of Test 1 both here and in the empirical literature 
that the observed relationship between debt maturity and risk ratings may reflect other factors.  In 
particular, there may be a problem if risk ratsings are assigned in part on the basis of the risks associated 
with the amount of time that the funds are tied up, as opposed to the credit risks of the firms.  Test 2 
examines different maturities for a given risk rating, minimizing the effects of this potential problem.  
II. Empirical literature review 
This section first reviews the empirical evidence regarding debt maturity under conditions of 
asymmetric information.  We focus on the relationship between maturity and risk ratings and the extent to 
which this relationship may be attributed to informational asymmetries as predicted by Flannery’s and 
Diamond’s models.  We do not discuss findings with regard to other theories of debt maturity, such as 
agency costs and taxes.  We then discuss how our empirical analysis differs from this literature. 
A.  Tests of Flannery’s and Diamond’s models 
Several studies examine the relationship between risk ratings and firm debt maturity structure, or 
the stock of debt that has been built up over time to test the predictions of Diamond’s model.  Barclay and 
Smith (1995) find that among publicly traded industrial firms with bond ratings, those with higher bond 
ratings tend to use more short-term debt and those with lower bond ratings tend to have more long-term 
debt.  Those without bond ratings generally have more short-term debt.  If one interprets firms with high 
bond ratings as low-risk, firms with low bond ratings as intermediate-risk, and unrated firms as high-risk, 
then their results as a whole may be considered to be consistent with Diamond’s predicted nonmonotonic 
relationship.  Subsequent studies by Stohs and Mauer (1996) using bond ratings for publicly traded 
industrial firms and Scherr and Hulbert (2001) using an accounting measure for risk ratings (Altman Z-  7   
Score) for small businesses also find evidence of a nonmonotonic relationship between firm risk ratings 
and debt maturity structure.  Johnson (2003) studies nonfinancial traded firms and uses three different 
types of risk ratings, two based on accounting data (firm size and earnings volatility), and one based on 
whether the firm’s debt is investment grade.  Johnson’s accounting indicators h ave the nonmonotonic 
relationship with the debt maturity structure, but the indicator for investment grade debt is negatively 
related to the proportion of short-term debt, which may be considered to be contrary to the predictions of 
Diamond’s model, under which low-risk firms would have short-term debt. 
These studies do not use the relationship between risk ratings and maturity to test the predictions 
of Flannery’s model, although some inferences might be drawn using our framework for Test 1 discussed 
above.  The nonmonotonic relationships in Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and 
Johnson (2003) using bond ratings may be considered to be consistent with the predictions of Flannery’s 
model for low-risk firms, but not for high-risk firms.  The relationships using accounting measures for 
risk ratings in Scherr and Hulbert (2001) and Johnson (2003) do not have implications for Flannery’s 
model.  The risk rating in Flannery’s model is based at least in part on the revelation of private 
information by firm maturity choice.  Although bond ratings may reflect such a revelation, accounting 
measures cannot. 
It is unclear, however, how well these empirical studies of debt maturity structure test the 
theoretical models.  Flannery’s and Diamond’s models deal with the maturity of new debt issues at the 
time of origination, not the remaining time on the stock of old contracts.  The use of the maturity structure 
does not distinguish between, for example, a newly issued one-year bond and a 30-year bond with one 
year remaining – both contribute to the stock of one-year securities in the debt maturity structure.  In 
addition, the debt maturity structure may reflect decisions made at different historical points in time when 
risk ratings and asymmetric information may have differed significantly from the sample period.
2 
Several studies avoid the potential problems with the use of maturity structure and focus on the 
maturity of new debt issues.  Mitchell (1993), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Ortiz-Molina and Penas 
(2004) estimate the relationship between the maturity of new debt issues and risk ratings, although these 
studies do not use specifications that allow for the nonmonotonic function predicted by Diamond’s model.  
Mitchell (1993) and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2004) use linear functions and Guedes and Opler (1996) use   8   
only two categories of risk ratings (investment grade versus non-investment grade).   
Mitchell (1993) uses data on publicly traded corporations and finds that those with higher bond 
ratings tend to have longer maturities.  Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2004) use data on small businesses and 
specify an accounting measure for the risk rating (prior delinquency).  They also find that firms rated as 
lower-risk tend have longer maturities than those rated as high-risk.  The results presented in both papers 
may be consistent with Diamond’s model for high-risk firms, but no strong conclusions may be taken 
because of the linear specifications.  Finally, Guedes and Opler (1996) study traded corporations and find 
that firms with investment-grade ratings tend to issue shorter- and longer-term debt, while non-investment 
grade firms tend to issue debt with intermediate maturity, which would appear to conflict with some of 
the predictions of Diamond’s model. 
As above for the studies using debt maturity structure, the studies using new debt issues do not 
use the relationship between risk ratings and maturity to test the predictions of Flannery’s model, but we 
may draw inferences based on our Test 1 framework.  The relationships found in the bond-ratings studies 
of Mitchell (1993) and Guedes and Opler (1996) appear to conflict with the upward-sloping function 
predicted by Flannery’s model.  The relationship in Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2004)  does not have 
implications for Flannery’s model because of the use of accounting data for risk ratings. 
Most of the studies discussed here – using both debt maturity structure and new debt issues – also 
include measures of asymmetric information in their specifications.  Some studies specify variables that 
may reflect the degree to which a firm’s ex ante private information is favorable versus unfavorable.  
Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Johnson (2003) include the ex post change in 
operating earnings per share, while Guedes and Opler (1996) include the ex post change in stock returns.  
To the extent that Flannery’s model is important in determining debt maturity through a separating 
equilibrium, it may be expected that firms with favorable ex ante private information would tend to have 
short maturities and vice versa for those with unfavorable ex ante private information. However, the 
estimated effect of the ex post measures might be expected to be relatively weak because these measures 
are likely to be noisy gauges of ex ante private information.  As well, the regression equations also 
include risk ratings as exogenous variables, which may also be indicators of favorable versus unfavorable 
private information under Flannery’s model.  Consistent with these arguments, the authors find relatively   9   
weak results in the application of these variables.  Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), 
and Johnson (2003) find that ex post increases in earnings are associated with short-term debt, but the 
economic magnitudes are quite s mall, except in Johnson (2003).  Guedes and Opler (1996) find no 
statistically significant relationship between maturity and a firm’s ex post change in stock returns. 
Many of these empirical studies also specify measures of asymmetric information or 
informational opacity of the firm regardless of whether the private information is favorable or 
unfavorable.  Such measures are analogous to the SBCS variable that we use to measure asymmetric 
information in our Tests 1 and 2.  Barclay and Smith (1995) find that firms with lower valuations, higher 
R&D spending, and more growth potential tend to issue more short-term debt, consistent with the notion 
that greater informational asymmetries are associated with shorter maturity.  Analogously, three of the 
studies find that smaller firms – which are likely to relatively opaque – tend to issue more short-term debt 
(Stohs and Mauer (1996), Scherr and Hulbert (2001), Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2004)).  The evidence with 
regard to firm age is less clear.  Scherr and Hulbert (2001) find that older firms issue less short-term debt, 
while Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2004) find that older firms issue more short-term debt.  However, as noted 
above, none of the studies to our knowledge distinguish the effects of asymmetric information on 
maturity by risk rating. 
B.  How our empirical analysis differs from the literature 
Clearly, there is room for additional empirical work on debt maturity.  Some of the studies use 
data on debt maturity structure, rather than new debt issues, and those using new debt issues employ 
specifications that do not allow for the nonmonotonic function predicted by Diamond’s model.  
Moreover, none of the studies to our knowledge interact the effects of asymmetric information with the 
risk ratings.  In this paper, we use data on new debt issues, employ a specification that allows for the 
nonmonotonic function predicted by Diamond’s model, and interact the effects of asymmetric 
information with the risk ratings. We also argue that our approach has several other advantages. 
First, our focus on bank loans to small businesses is advantageous, since small businesses tend to 
fit the profile of risky firms under conditions of asymmetric information for which the theories are 
written.  The small business loans used here have a broad range of maturities from one day to thirty years.  
Most other empirical studies focus on corporations issuing debt in public markets, although two of the   10   
others also use small business data (Scherr and Hulburt (2001) and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2004)). 
Second, we include several additional loan contract terms in the regressions to help control for 
other important factors that may affect maturity.  Other studies are often unable to control for all of these 
potentially confounding factors, which may be directly related to risk ratings, informational asymmetries, 
and debt maturity. 
Third, our use of information about whether and how banks use the SBCS technology provides a 
very clean measure of asymmetric information that confers advantages to both of our tests.  Test 1 focuses 
on loans made by banks that have not adopted the SBCS information technology, given that the 
relationships between debt maturity and firm risk ratings should be strongest when informational 
asymmetries are greatest.  Other studies d o not distinguish the effects of risk ratings by the level of 
informational asymmetries.  Test 2 differentiates the effects of the differences in asymmetric information 
by risk rating for the first time.  We argue that it is important to conduct these tests by risk rating, given 
that the theoretical model predictions vary with firm ratings. 
III.  Brief outline of the empirical tests 
To test the theoretical models, we combine data on the maturities, risk ratings, and other contract 
terms of loans to small businesses with facts about the banks that extend these loans and information on 
whether and how these banks employ the small business credit scoring (SBCS) lending technology.  We 
base our two tests on a simple regression model of the maturities of the individual loans: 
 
ln(1+Maturity) = a + b1*SCORE + g2*RISK2 + g3*RISK3+ g4*RISK4   
      + d2*SCORE*RISK2 + d3*SCORE*RISK3 + d4*SCORE*RISK4 
           + Control variables for the lending bank and loan contract terms.                (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of one plus Maturity, where Maturity is the time in years until 
full repayment of the loan is scheduled.  The one is included to avoid taking the log of a value close to 
zero.  SCORE is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the SBCS technology is employed in 
conjunction with another lending technology to reduce informational asymmetries, and zero if SBCS is 
not used.  As discussed below, loan observations from banks that use SBCS in ways that are ambiguous 
with respect to reducing informational asymmetries  – using scores to automatically approve/reject   11   
applicants – are excluded.  RISK1 through RISK4 are dummy variables for risk ratings on the loan from 
safest (RISK1) to riskiest (RISK4).  We treat RISK1 as the base category and exclude the RISK1 and 
SCORE*RISK1 variables, i.e., we set g1 = d1 = 0.  Thus, we estimate loan maturity as a function of 
measures of informational asymmetries, risk ratings, and their interactions, as well as some control 
variables.  We provide more details on the data sources, variables and estimation procedures below. 
In Test 1, we examine whether maturity is an upward-sloping function of the risk ratings as 
predicted by Flannery’s model versus the nonmonotonic function predicted by Diamond’s model.  We 
evaluate predicted maturities for RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, and RISK4 at SCORE = 0, i.e., for loans made 
by banks that have not adopted SBCS.  We focus on non-scoring banks for Test 1 because the 
relationships between maturity and risk ratings should be strongest when informational asymmetries are 
greatest.  We test the difference in predicted maturity for the safest risk rating RISK1 versus the two 
intermediate risk ratings, RISK2 and RISK3.  Thus, we test H0: g2 = 0 and H0: g3 = 0, where the subscript 
0 refers to the null hypothesis.  Similarly, we test the difference in predicted maturity for the highest risk 
rating RISK4 versus RISK2 and RISK3, i.e., the null hypotheses H 0:  g4 - g2 = 0 and H 0:  g4 - g3 = 0.  
Although Flannery’s original model had only two firm risk categories, the extension to incorporating 
intermediate categories is straightforward. 
Thus, Test 1 examines whether the lowest-risk and highest-risk firms have shorter or longer 
maturities than intermediate-risk firms.  Both Flannery’s and Diamond’s models predict the lowest-risk 
firms to have shorter maturity than intermediate-risk firms, i.e., HA:F,D: g2 > 0 and HA:F,D: g3 > 0, where the 
subscript A refers to the alternative hypothesis, subscript F to Flannery’s model, and subscript D to 
Diamond’s model.  Flannery’s model also predicts the highest-risk firms to have longer maturities than 
intermediate-risk firms, i.e., HA:F: g4 - g2 > 0 and HA:F: g4 - g3 > 0.  In contrast, Diamond’s model predicts 
shorter maturities for the highest-risk firms than for intermediate-risk firms, i.e., HA:D: g4 - g2 < 0 and HA:D: 
g4 - g3 < 0.  Thus, we test the following null versus alternative hypotheses in Test 1: 
 
Test 1:  a) H0: g2 = 0 versus HA: F,D: g2 > 0,  
b) H0: g3 d= 0 versus HA:F,D: g3 > 0, 
c) H0: g4 - g2 = 0 versus HA:F: g4 - g2 > 0 and HA:D: g4 - g2 < 0, 
d) H0: g4 - g3 = 0 versus HA:F: g4 - g3 > 0 and HA:D: g4 - g3 < 0.              (2)   12   
 
In Test 2, we examine the effects of reduced informational asymmetries from SBCS on debt 
maturity for each risk rating.  As discussed, for a reduction in asymmetries, Flannery’s model would 
predict an increase in maturity for low-risk firms and smaller increases in debt maturity for intermediate-
risk firms.  Diamond’s model would predict a similar increase in maturity for low-risk firms. 
We assess the effect of the reduction in informational asymmetries by testing for the difference in 
predicted maturity for SCORE = 1 versus SCORE = 0 for each risk rating.  For the safest firms (RISK1 = 
1), we test the null hypothesis H 0: b1 = 0.  Similarly, we test null hypotheses for the differences in 
predicted maturity for SCORE = 1 versus SCORE = 0 for the other three risk ratings, RISK2 (H0: b1 + d2 
= 0), RISK3 (H0: b1 + d3 = 0), and RISK4 (H0: b1 + d4 = 0).
3  As well, we test the null of whether the 
predicted differences are equal for the intermediate risk ratings with the safest risk rating, i.e., H0: d2 = 0 
and H0: d3 = 0.  Both Flannery’s and Diamond’s models would predict an increase in maturity for low-
risk firms as informational asymmetries are reduced, i.e., HA:F,D: b1 > 0.  Flannery’s model would also 
predict maturity increases for firms with intermediate risk ratings from reduced informational 
asymmetries, but these increases would be smaller than for the safest risk rating, i.e., HA:F: b1 + d2 > 0 and 
d2 < 0 and HA:F: b1 + d3 > 0 and d3 < 0.
4  Thus, we test the following hypotheses in Test 2: 
 
Test 2:  a) H0: b1 = 0 versus HA:F,D: b1 > 0,  
b) H0: b1 + d2 = 0 and d2 = 0 versus HA:F: b1 + d2 > 0 and d2 < 0, 
c) H0: b1 + d3 = 0 and d3 = 0 versus HA:F: b1 + d3 > 0 and d3 < 0, 
d) H0: b1 + d4 = 0.                            (3) 
 
We test the null hypothesis for RISK4 in (d) for completeness, although neither of the theories predicts a 
significant effect of a change in asymmetric information on maturity for the highest-risk firms.  
IV.  Compilation of the data set 
We combine data from three sources to obtain the variables to estimate Equation 1 and conduct 
Tests 1 and 2.  The first source is the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Bank Lending (STBL), which 
contains details on the contract terms of all new domestic commercial and industrial (C&I) loans issued 
by surveyed banks during one or more days of the first week of the second month of each quarter.  
Starting in the second quarter of 1997, the banks report risk ratings on each loan as well.  The STBL   13   
includes almost all of the largest U.S. banks plus a stratified random sample of smaller banks. 
The second source is the set of regulatory reports on the banks that issue the loans.  The bank Call 
Report and other regulatory files provide information on the balance sheets, income statements, 
ownership changes, markets, and so forth for all U.S. banks. 
Our third data source is a January 1998 telephone survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta, which provides information on whether and how surveyed b anks use the SBCS lending 
technology.  The data include whether and when the technology was implemented, the sizes of credits that are 
scored,  whether the credit scores are used in automated approval/rejection and pricing decisions, and 
whether the bank purchased credit scores.  The survey  queries 190 of the 200 largest U.S. banking 
organizations, of which 99 institutions respond.  See Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) for a more 
detailed discussion of the survey. 
Our data set is compiled from the intersection of these three sources, so that complete information 
is available on the contract terms and risk ratings on each loan, the bank that extended the loan, and 
whether and how that bank uses the SBCS technology.  The sample contains observations from t he 
second, third, and fourth quarters of 1997, when the risk ratings are available from the STBL and the 
SBCS information is available from the credit scoring survey.  We identify 53 banks that respond to the 
STBL during these three quarters and also respond to the January 1998 credit scoring survey.
5 
We include only loans with total credit size under $250,000, because SBCS models are generally 
only designed for credits up to this size.  Total credit size is calculated as the maximum of the loan 
amount and size of the commitment under which it is drawn, if any.  As is standard procedure in bank 
lending research, we refer to these credits as small business loans, although in some cases they may be 
small credits to large businesses.
6 
We also divide the sample into credits under $100,000 (< $100K), and credits of $100,000 to 
$250,000 ($100K - $250K) because some banks only use SBCS to evaluate credits < $100K, while others 
use the technology to evaluate credits up to $250K.  In the full SBCS survey, all of the banks that used 
SBCS (62 of the 99 responding banks) applied the technology to credits < $100K, and 74percent of these 
banks (46 of the 62 SBCS users) also applied it to credits of $100K - $250K (Frame, Srinivasan, and 
Woosley 2001). Other research also suggests that SBCS may have different effects for the two loan size   14   
classes (Berger, Frame, and Miller (forthcoming)). 
As noted earlier, we focus on the use of the SBCS technology when it is likely to reduce 
informational asymmetries.  This is most likely to  occur when the SBCS technology is used  in 
conjunction with another lending technology, i.e., when the credit score is added to the information set 
produced by financial statement lending, asset-based lending, relationship lending, or other lending 
technology.
7  Following this logic, we include loans from banks that use SBCS only if they also use 
another lending technology in the decision to accept or reject the credit application.  Banks that report on 
the SBCS survey that they use the SBCS technology to automatically accept/reject credit applications are 
deleted from our samples because the effects of this use of the technology on informational asymmetries 
are ambiguous.  Thus, our empirical treatment of a reduction in informational asymmetries is based on the 
difference between banks that use SBCS in conjunction with another lending technology to make the loan 
underwriting decision and banks that do not use SBCS at all.  Consistent with this treatment, other 
research using these survey data finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the use of SBCS as a 
complement to other technologies improved accuracy in evaluating creditworthiness, resulting in 
significantly lower loan risk (Berger, Frame, and Miller (forthcoming)). 
V.  Variables and summary statistics 
Table I provides means and standard deviations of the variables used in the regressions and tests, 
shown separately for the two samples, credits < $100K and credits of $100K - $250K.  Maturity is 
measured as the time in years before the scheduled repayment of all principal and interest, and ranges 
from one day to 30 years.  For a significant minority of loans that have no stated maturity, we impute 
maturity as the time until the interest is first compounded or paid.  If this date is not reported, we treat 
these as one-day or overnight loans. We discuss altering these assumptions in the robustness section 
below.  As shown, the average maturity is over one year for both samples. 
[Insert Table I about here.] 
  The variable SCORE equals one if the bank reports that it employs SBCS for that size category 
of loans and does not use it for automatic accept/reject decisions (data from banks that use SBCS for 
automatic accept/reject decisions are deleted).  We set SCORE = 0 if the bank does not use SBCS for that 
size category.  As shown, more than half of the sample loans are made by banks that use SBCS.   15   
The RISK1 through RISK4 variables are dummies for risk ratings on the loan assigned by the 
bank from safest (RISK1) to riskiest (RISK4).  RISK1 equals one when the bank reports on the STBL that 
the loan carries “minimal” risk.  RISK2 equals one when the loan carries “low” risk.  RISK3 equals one 
when the loan carries “moderate” risk.  RISK4 equals one when the loan carries “acceptable” risk.
8  As 
shown, most of the loans have the two highest risk ratings.
9 
We control for bank size because different sized banks may treat small business borrowers 
differently.  The regressions include ln(GTA), the natural log of bank gross total assets.  There are no 
small banks in the samples because the SBCS survey queries only large institutions.  The average GTA is 
about $17 billion for credits < $100K and about $31 billion for credits of $100K - $250K, and the overall 
range of banks is from about $1.5 billion to $245 billion.  The difference in sample means occurs because 
the small banks more often use SBCS only on credits < $100K.
10 
We control for the loan portfolio health of the bank, which may affect the bank’s proclivities to 
lend to risky firms, to lend at different maturities, or to make new loans.  The regressions include NPL, 
the bank’s ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans.  The average NPL in both samples is 0.014, 
meaning that 1.4 percent of loans are past due 30 days or more days or are on a nonaccrual basis.  Both 
GTA and NPL are constructed from the December 1996 Call Report.  We use bank data from prior to the 
loans being issued to help mitigate potential endogeneity problems. 
We control for three loan contract terms, a dummy for whether collateral is pledged (COLLAT); 
a dummy for whether the loan is drawn under a commitment (COMMIT); and the total credit size, 
including the amount of any commitment (CREDIT SIZE).  These variables may be associated with 
asymmetric information, risk ratings, and maturity choice, so exclusion of these variables may create 
spurious relationships between maturity and the key exogenous variables.  However, these variables could 
also introduce an endogeneity problem because the bank and the firm may trade off among maturity and 
other contract terms.  As a consequence, we run all regressions with and without contract terms to 
evaluate the robustness of our results.
11  Table I shows that most of the loans are secured and drawn under 
commitments.  The means of CREDIT SIZE are about $44,000 for credits < $100K and about $184,000 
for credits of $100K - $250K.  
Finally, the regressions include Q3 and Q4, two seasonal dummy variables that indicate whether   16   
the loan was made in the third and fourth quarters of 1997, respectively (not shown in tables).  A dummy 
for the second quarter dummy is excluded as the base case. 
VI.  Empirical test results 
A.  Main regression results 
Table II shows our main regressions for loan maturity based on the specification in Equation (1).  
We run OLS regressions separately for credits < $100K and for credits of $100K - $250K, and run each 
regression both with and without the potentially endogenous loan contract terms, COLLAT, COMMIT, 
and ln(CREDIT SIZE).  Robust standard errors are calculated using a clustering correction that accounts 
for heteroskedasticity and for correlations among observations from the same bank.
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[Insert Table II about here.] 
For expositional convenience, we first briefly discuss the control variable results.  The data 
suggest that larger bank size is associated with shorter maturities, consistent with theories that larger 
banks have a comparative disadvantage in small business lending, all else equal.  Higher nonperforming 
loan-to-asset ratios are also associated with shorter maturities, consistent with the expectation that banks 
with portfolios in poor condition may be more cautious with the contract terms on new loans.  Collateral 
is associated with shorter maturities for credits < $100K, consistent with the expectation that banks may 
both require that collateral be pledged and that maturity be short for firms subject to significant moral 
hazard or adverse selection problems.  Collateral has no statistically significant effect for credits of $100K 
- $250K.  Commitments are associated with shorter maturities for smaller credits, perhaps because 
commitments are substitutes for long maturities on the loans themselves.  Finally, total credit size is not 
strongly associated with loan maturity, although this finding may in part reflect the fact that there is 
relatively little variation in credit size within each sample (< $100K, $100K - $250K). 
We show the main results of our key exogenous variables graphically in Figure 1.  Using the 
parameter estimates from the regressions, we map the predicted maturities for the four different risk 
ratings, holding the control variables at their sample means in each case.  We evaluate the predictions 
separately for SCORE = 0 (solid lines) and for SCORE = 1 (dashed lines).  We use the predictions for 
SCORE = 0 in Test 1 to determine the effect of risk on maturity when informational asymmetries are at 
their greatest.  We use the predicted differences for each risk rating between SCORE = 1 and SCORE = 0   17   
in Test 2 to see the how the effects of reducing informational asymmetries affects maturity by risk rating. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
B.  Test 1 findings – The effects of risk on debt maturity 
Turning first to the Test 1 findings, loan maturity appears to be an upward-sloping function of 
risk in Figure 1.  As shown in panel (a) of the figure (and replicated in the first column of Table III), for 
credits < $100K with loan contract terms included, the predicted maturities for non-scoring banks for 
RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, and RISK4 are 0.67, 1.36, 1.58, and 1.67 years, respectively.  Thus, maturity 
goes up by a full year, more than doubling, as firms move from the low-risk to the high-risk ratings, with 
most of the increase occurring between RISK1 and RISK2.  We will test below whether this large 
increase is statistically significant.  The upward slope for SCORE = 0 is also apparent in the other three 
panels, with the largest increase always being between RISK1 and RISK2.  The upward slope throughout 
is consistent with Flannery’s model, and the upward slope between low-risk and intermediate-risk is also 
consistent with Diamond’s model.  However, the finding that maturity does not fall for high-risk firms 
does not appear to be consistent with Diamond’s model, which would predict relatively short maturities 
for these firms. 
We show the formal statistical tests of Test 1 in Table III for the two samples, credits < $100K 
and $100K - $250K, using the regressions with and without the contract terms included.  For each of 
these four cases, we first show the predicted maturity for each risk rating, evaluated at SCORE = 0 and 
the sample means for the control variables.  As shown in Equation (2) and discussed in Section III above, 
we then test the difference in predicted maturity for the safest risk rating RISK1 versus the two 
intermediate risk ratings, RISK2 and RISK3, evaluated at SCORE = 0, i.e., the null hypotheses H0: g2 = 0 
and H0: g3 = 0.  We also test the difference in predicted maturity for the highest risk rating RISK 4 versus 
RISK2 and RISK3, i.e., the null hypotheses H0: g4 - g2 = 0 and H0: g4 - g3 = 0.  We are able to reject the 
null hypothesis in favor of the alternative that the lowest-risk loans (RISK1) have shorter maturities than 
the intermediate-risk loans (RISK2, RISK3) in six of eight cases, consistent with the predictions of 
Flannery’s and Diamond’s model.  Notably, we are able to reject the null in favor of the alternative that 
RISK1 loans have shorter maturity than either or both of RISK2 and RISK3 loans in all four regressions.  
These findings are also consistent with most of the findings in the empirical literature.   18   
[Insert Table III about here.] 
However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the highest-risk loans (RISK4) have the same 
maturities as the intermediate-risk loans (RISK2, RISK3).  Thus, although the predicted values for RISK4 
at SCORE = 0 are the highest in Figure 1, they are not statistically significantly different than the 
predicted values for RISK2 and RISK3.  This finding conflicts with the predictions of Diamond’s model 
and contrasts with most of the empirical literature that uses historically based debt maturity structure.  
Importantly, this finding does not suggest that Diamond’s model does not apply to any of the high-risk 
firms, but rather that such effects could be empirically dominated by other high-risk firms for which 
maturity does not increase with risk ratings. 
We also note that the results of Test 1 would be substantially weaker if it were applied to 
observations for which SCORE = 1, with reduced informational asymmetries from SBCS.  As shown by 
the dashed lines in panel (a) of Figure 1 (and replicated below in Table IV), for credits < $100K with loan 
contract terms included, the predicted maturities for RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, and RISK4 are 1.14, 1.59, 
1.33, and 1.32 years, respectively, for SCORE = 1 banks.  Thus, predicted maturity rises less between 
RISK1 and RISK2 for SCORE = 1 than for SCORE = 0 (0.45 years versus 0.69 years), and then falls for 
the higher risk ratings.  The statistical significance is also weaker and in some cases nonexistent for 
SCORE = 1 (not shown in tables).  These results highlight the importance of informational asymmetries 
in the theoretical models and in the determination of debt maturity. 
C.  Test 2 findings – The effects of reducing informational asymmetries on debt maturity 
Turning next to the Test 2 findings, in Figure 1 loan maturity appears to increase when shifting 
from SCORE = 0 to SCORE = 1 for the lower-risk ratings, but decrease for the higher-risk ratings.  As 
shown in panel (a) of the figure (and replicated in Table IV) for credits < $100K with loan contract terms 
included, the predicted maturity for RISK1 increases from 0.67 years for SCORE = 0 to 1.14 years for 
SCORE = 1.  This predicted increase of 0.48 years, or about 72 percent, for the low-risk firms from 
employing the credit scoring technology in conjunction with another lending technology is substantial in 
magnitude.  For RISK2, the predicted maturity increase is 0.23 years, from 1.36 to 1.59 years.  However, 
for RISK3 and RISK4, the predicted maturities actually fall when moving from SCORE = 0 to SCORE = 
1.  The same qualitative pattern appears in the other three panels.  Notably, for the low-risk credits of   19   
$100K - $250K, the predicted maturity more than doubles from SCORE = 0 to SCORE = 1, suggesting an 
even larger quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity for these larger 
credits.  The increase in maturity for lower-risk firms from a reduction in informational asymmetries is 
consistent with Flannery’s and Diamond’s models, but the fall in maturity for the higher-risk firms is not 
consistent with these models. 
Turning to formal statistical tests of Test 2, we test the difference in predicted maturity for 
SCORE = 1 versus SCORE = 0 by risk rating as shown in Equation (3) above.  We test the null 
hypotheses of no effect of SCORE for each of the risk ratings, i.e., we test H0: b1 = 0, H0: b1 + d2 = 0, H0: 
b1 + d3 = 0, and H0: b1 + d4 = 0, for RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, and RISK4, respectively.  These tests are 
shown in Table IV.  For the intermediate risk ratings, RISK2 and RISK3, we also test null hypotheses of 
no difference in effect from the safest firms RISK1, i.e., we test H0: d2 = 0 and H0: d3 = 0 for RISK2 and 
RISK3, respectively.  These tests are easily culled from the regression equation results shown in Table II.  
As shown in Table IV, we are able to statistically reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative that 
SBCS increases maturities for the lowest-risk loans (RISK1) for all four estimations.  The large, 
statistically significant increase in maturity is consistent with the predictions of Flannery’s and 
Diamond’s models that reductions in informational asymmetries reduce the benefit for low-risk firms 
from borrowing short-term.  However, we cannot statistically reject the null hypothesis that the movement 
from SCORE = 0 to SCORE = 1 has no effect for the other risk ratings.  As shown in Table II, none of the 
estimates of d2 are statistically significant.  The estimates of d3 are negative and statistically significant, 
consistent with a predicted reduction in maturity for RISK3 firms relative to RISK1 firms from a 
reduction in informational asymmetries.  However, as shown above, the total effect for this risk rating, b1 
+ d3, is not statistically significant. 
[Insert Table IV about here.] 
VII.  Additional empirical checks 
We conduct some additional empirical checks to ensure that our main findings are robust and are 
not the product of particular choices of samples, variables, or specifications, and do not reflect spurious 
outcomes due to endogeneity problems. 
A.  Sample and specification changes   20   
We first perform a number of checks based on changes in sample and specification.  We try 
altering the sample by excluding loans with the longest one percent and five percent of Maturity to 
investigate whether outliers drive our results.    In both cases, our findings remain materially unchanged.  
We also try altering the dependent variable by replacing ln (1+Maturity) with the level of Maturity, and 
the main results continue to hold.  Similarly, we try replacing the dependent variable with ln(1+Duration), 
where Duration is the weighted-average time until all scheduled principal and interest payments are made.  
Again the main results hold, with somewhat weaker statistical significance.  In addition, we try including 
more control variables for the lending bank and its market: the bank’s age, dummies indicating whether 
the bank survived a merger or was acquired by a different holding company in the previous three years, 
and the weighted-average market Herfindahl index of deposit concentration and the weighted-average 
personal income growth in all of the bank’s local markets – with no qualitative effect on the main results.  
To control for potential asset-liability maturity matching, we try including the proportion of the bank’s 
time deposits that mature in less than one year, again with no qualitative effect on the main results. 
We also try altering our maintained hypothesis regarding the effects of SBCS on informational 
asymmetries.  In our main specification, we include loans from banks that use SBCS only if they do not 
use the technology to automatically accept/reject credit applications, so that we have only observations in 
which another lending technology is used in the key underwriting decision.  We try partially relaxing this 
constraint by also including observations from banks that do not use SBCS to set loan terms, and banks 
that develop their own SBCS models, which are also indicators that the bank is using SBCS in 
conjunction with another lending technology.  Again, the test results are materially unchanged. 
As noted above, for loans with no stated maturity (18.5 percent of credits < $100K and 29.5 
percent of credits of $100K-$250K), we impute maturity as the time until the interest is first compounded 
or paid if reported, or assign maturity of one day otherwise.  Our results are robust to an alternative 
imputation that assigns a maturity of zero for all of these loans.  When we exclude the loans with no 
stated maturity from the sample of credits < 100K, the Test 1 results retain economic and statistic 
significance, but the Test 2 results do not.  When we exclude these loans from the sample of credits of 
$100K - $250K, both the Test 1 and the Test 2 results retain economic and statistical significance.  Our 
results are also robust to the exclusion of all overnight loans.      21   
For a sizable minority of the credits in our samples (16.8 percent of credits < $100K, 26.3  
percent of credits of $100K-$250K), the bank maintains an unqualified ability to call the credit at any 
time.  One possible explanation of our lack of support for Diamond’s model for high-risk firms is that the 
bank offers these firms callable loans with long maturities, using the call option instead of short maturity 
to address asymmetric information problems.  To test this, we redefine maturity to equal zero if the loan is 
callable, regardless of the stated maturity.  For both credit size samples, the Test 1 and Test 2 results hold 
with essentially unchanged economic and statistical significance.  The main results are also robust to the 
exclusion of all callable loans. 
In addition, we run Test 1 for larger credits of $250,000 to $1 million ($250K - $1M) and $1 
million to $10 million ($1M  - $10M).  Since SBCS technology is generally not used on these larger 
credits, we can run Test 1 using all banks that respond to the STBL survey, whether or not they respond 
to the SBCS survey.  However, we cannot run Test 2 for these larger credits, since we cannot examine the 
effect of SBCS on these loans.  We run Test 1 on these two credit size classes separately and also run 
these tests by bank size class to avoid confounding the effects of differences in size with difference in 
risk.  We also run these tests for the full STBL sample and for the 53 large banks included in our main 
samples here for which we have SBCS information to be sure that sample selection does not explain the 
findings.  That is, we run Test 1 for larger credits for several different samples of larger credits using the 
same hypothesis specification as in Equation (2) and using the same regression specification as in 
Equation (1) except that the SCORE variable and interactions are deleted.  In all cases, we find no 
statistically significant relationship between maturity and risk rating for either low-risk or high-risk firms, 
so the findings are not consistent with either Flannery’s or Diamond’s models for larger bank credits.  
This may suggest that asymmetric information problems are less severe on these larger loans or that the 
banks have methods other than maturity to help resolve information problems on larger loans.
13 
Finally, we analyze subsamples delineated by whether the credits were secured with collateral 
(COLLAT = 1) or not (COLLAT = 0), and drawn under a commitment (COMMIT = 1) or not (COMMIT 
= 0).  Like maturity, collateral and commitments are loan contracting tools that may be used to help 
mitigate information problems. The subsample regressions may give insight into whether collateral or 
commitments may substitute for maturity in reducing information problems.  These regressions may also   22   
give inferences about clientele effects, or how the use of maturity may vary for different types of firms.
14 
For the COLLAT = 1, COLLAT = 0, and COMMIT = 1 subsamples, the main results generally 
hold with similar coefficients, albeit with weaker statistical significance apparently due to the reduced 
degrees of freedom in estimation.
15  The findings that the results generally hold for the COLLAT = 1 and 
COMMIT = 1 subsamples  suggest that these contract terms more likely complement, rather than 
substitute for maturity in dealing with asymmetric information problems. 
 However, we do find different results for the COMMIT = 0 subsample that are consistent with 
Diamond’s model for both low-risk and high-risk firms.  In Test 1 for the credits < $100K that are not 
commitment draws, the predicted maturities for RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, and RISK4 at SCORE = 0 are 
1.00, 1.64, 2.38, and 1.53, respectively.   The predicted values for RISK1 and RISK4 are considerably 
shorter than the predicted value for RISK3, and the differences are statistically significant (t-statistics of 
10.30 and 2.99, respectively).  For the credits of $100K - $250K, the curve also has the nonmonotonic 
shape for the COMMIT = 0 subsample, although the differences are not statistically significant.  Thus, for 
Test 1, we find a nonmonotonic relationship between risk and maturity that is consistent with Diamond’s 
model for this subsample.  In Test 2, there is little change from the main results for the COMMIT = 0 
subsample. 
The collateral and commitment subsample findings support the robustness of our main findings in 
most cases, although the exception for COMMIT = 0 is the most interesting.  The finding of short 
maturity for high-risk firms without loan commitments – as in Diamond’s model – is consistent with a 
clientele effect in which these firms may be offered only short maturities to help mitigate their 
information problems because they tend to be relatively opaque.  This m ay also occur because firms 
without commitments tend to be those without strong banking relationships to help address their 
information problems. 
B.  The potential endogeneity of the loan risk ratings 
A potential endogeneity problem in our main results could occur because to some extent, the 
measured risk ratings may be endogenous to the SCORE variable.  In particular, the significant maturity 
increase for RISK1 firms when shifting from SCORE = 0 to SCORE = 1 in Test 2 could be driven by a 
reassessment of firm risk following SBCS adoption.  That is, the finding could reflect a migration of firms   23   
with generally longer maturities from the RISK2, RISK3, or RISK4 ratings being relabeled as RISK1 
because they are thought to be lower risk as a result of credit scoring instead of our interpretation that 
credit scoring reduced informational asymmetries and led to longer maturities.  To examine this 
possibility, we show in Table V the results of logit regressions for the probability that RISK1 = 1 for the 
same samples and with the same explanatory variables other than RISK as in the main regressions.  If a 
reassessment of risk due to credit scoring explained our Test 2 result, we would expect a positive 
coefficient on SCORE as firms with relatively high maturities from the other risk ratings move into the 
low-risk rating.  As shown, the coefficient of SCORE is not statistically different than zero in any of the 
four logit equations, making the alternative explanation of our main Test 2 finding relatively unlikely. 
[Insert Table V about here.] 
C.  The potential endogeneity of SBCS 
Our test results could alternatively be driven in part by the potential endogeneity of the choice to 
adopt the SBCS technology.  Some conditions that face the lending bank for which we are unable to 
control may affect both the maturity of its newly issued loans and its probability of adopting SBCS.  In 
this event, the observed associations between SCORE and Maturity may be spuriously determined.  To 
mitigate this potential problem, we try excluding observations from banks that adopted SBCS within one 
year of the time the loan is issued.  That is, we create a time barrier of at least one year between the 
conditions under which SBCS is adopted and the conditions under which the maturity is chosen to reduce 
any spurious association.  The main results are robust to this change.
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VIII.  Conclusions  
We test the implications of theoretical models of Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) 
concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information on debt maturity and further explore the 
importance of asymmetric information in debt maturity choices.  The theoretical models, empirical tests 
of these models, and recent international financial crises, have raised significant academic and policy 
interests in issues related to debt maturity. 
The extant empirical literature does not come to consensus regarding these theories, which may 
be due to several factors.  Many of the studies use data on debt maturity structure, but the theoretical 
models are based on the maturity of new debt issues at the time of origination, not the remaining time on   24   
the stock of old contracts.  The studies that use data on new debt issues employ specifications that do not 
allow for the nonmonotonic function predicted by Diamond’s model.  In addition, none of the empirical 
studies distinguish the effects of asymmetric information on maturity by risk rating, as implied by the 
theories.  In this paper, we use data on new debt issues, employ a specification that allows for the 
nonmonotonic function  predicted by Diamond’s model, and interact the effects of asymmetric 
information with the risk ratings.  Other advantages of our approach include the use of a very clean 
measure of asymmetric information based on the use of credit scoring technology. 
We test the theories using data on the maturities, risk ratings, and other contract terms of over 
6,000 newly issued individual loans to small businesses, data on the banks that extend these loans, and 
information on whether and how these banks employ small business credit scoring, a lending technology 
that may reduce informational asymmetries.  Our Test 1 examines the effects of the banks’ risk ratings on 
maturity under conditions in which informational asymmetries are expected to be great (no credit 
scoring), while our Test 2 examines the effects of a reduction in informational asymmetries (the use of 
credit scoring in conjunction with another lending technology) on maturity for each of the different risk 
ratings.  Both the performance of Test 1 under conditions of greatest informational asymmetries and the 
performance of Test 2 by different risk ratings are unique to the literature.    We also perform a number of 
robustness checks to be sure that our findings are not the product of particular choices of samples, 
variables, or specifications, and do not reflect spurious outcomes due to endogeneity problems.                                      
Our test results are consistent with the predictions of both Flannery’s and Diamond’s models for 
low-risk firms.  All el se equal, these firms tend to have significantly shorter maturities than other firms 
(Test 1), and these maturities tend to increase significantly amounts when informational asymmetries are 
reduced (Test 2).  The latter result also suggests a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in 
the determination of debt maturity.  For high-risk firms, our main test results conflict with the predictions 
of Diamond’s model and with many of the prior empirical studies.  All else equal, high-risk firms do not 
have significantly different maturities than intermediate-risk firms, whereas Diamond’s theory would 
predict that banks would impose short maturities on the riskiest firms. 
Our finding for high-risk firms may reflect in part an important difference between banks and 
public debt markets.  Banks may have comparative advantages over public markets in gathering   25   
information, renegotiating loans, and enforcing other loan contract terms, such as collateral and restrictive 
covenants. Thus, banks may be better able than public markets to use tools other than short maturities to 
help resolve moral hazard and adverse selection problems for risky firms.  Some additional checks of the 
data are consistent with this possibility and suggest that within the category of bank loans, the results 
differ with the degree of informational asymmetries.   26   
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Table I.  Variables and Summary Statistics for the Two Samples 
Means and standard deviations for variables used in estimation.  Both samples combine loan observations from 
banks that do not use credit scoring technology (SCORE = 0) with loan observations from banks that use credit 
scoring technology but not to automatically approve/reject loans (SCORE = 1).  Maturity is the time in years 
before the repayment of principal and interest is scheduled to be completed.  SCORE is a dummy variable that
equals one if the bank adopted credit scoring technology before the loan was made.  RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, and 
RISK4 are dummy variables that equal one if the loan is rated "minimal," "low," "moderate," and "acceptable" 
risk, respectively.  RISK1 is excluded from the regressions as the base case.  GTA is the gross total assets of the 
bank ($000).  NPL is the bank's ratio of nonperforming loans (past due 30 days or more days or nonaccrual) to 
total loans.  GTA and NPL are measured from the previous year's December Call Reports to mitigate potential 
endogeneity problems.  COLLAT is a dummy that equals one if the loan is secured.  COMMIT is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the loan is made under commitment.  CREDIT SIZE is the maximum of the loan 
amount and the amount of commitment, if any.   
     Credits < $100K    Credits of $100K - $250K   
     (N=3622)  (N=2910)   
  Dependent Variable         
  Maturity  1.505  1.234   
     (1.726)  (1.877)   
  Credit Scoring and Risk Variables      
  SCORE  0.624  0.528   
     (0.484)  (0.499)   
  RISK1  0.035  0.019   
     (0.185)  (0.136)   
  RISK2  0.118  0.073   
     (0.323)  (0.260)   
  RISK3  0.610  0.488   
     (0.488)  (0.500)   
  RISK4  0.237  0.421   
     (0.425)  (0.494)   
  Bank Variables          
  GTA  17,048,837  30,832,584   
     (34,625,844)  (45,515,624)   
  NPL  0.014  0.014   
     (0.012)  (0.009)   
  Loan Contract Terms      
  COLLAT  0.719  0.789   
     (0.449)  (0.408)   
  COMMIT  0.610  0.815   
     (0.488)  (0.389)   
  CREDIT SIZE ($000)  43.58  183.72   
     (32.47)  (45.00)   
   29   
 
Table II.  Maturity Regressions 
OLS regressions for ln(1+Maturity), where Maturity is the time in years before the repayment of principal and 
interest is scheduled to be completed.  Both samples combine loan observations from banks that do not use credit 
scoring technology (SCORE = 0) with loan observations from banks that use credit scoring technology but not to 
automatically approve/reject loans (SCORE = 1).  Regressions include RISK2, RISK3, and RISK4, dummy 
variables that equal one if the loan is rated "low," "moderate," and "acceptable" risk, respectively (RISK1 or 
"minimal" risk is excluded as the base case); ln(GTA), the natural log of gross total assets of the bank ($000);  
NPL, the bank's ratio of nonperforming loans (past due 30 days or more days or nonaccrual) to total loans; 
COLLAT, a dummy that equals one if the loan is secured; COMMIT, a dummy variable that equals one if the 
loan is made under commitment; and ln(CREDIT SIZE), the natural log of the maximum of the loan amount and 
the amount of commitment ($000), if any.  Regressions also include Q3 and Q4, which indicate the quarter in 
which the loan was made.  Q2 is excluded as the base case (our sample includes the final three quarters of 1997).  
Robust t-statistics are calculated using a clustering correction for correlations among observations from the same 
bank (we impose a zero correlation across banks), and heteroskedasticity.  Significance at the 10 percent, five 
percent and one percent levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
   Credits < $100K  Credits of $100K - $250K 
Variables:  Contract Terms  No Contract Terms  Contract Terms  No Contract Terms 
   Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept  2.901***  4.11  2.999***  3.93  1.092  1.53  1.137**  2.05 
        Credit Scoring and Risk        
SCORE  0.251***  2.97  0.167**  2.26  0.403***  3.05  0.387***  3.08 
RISK2  0.345***  3.27  0.236**  2.29  0.151  1.15  0.143  1.10 
RISK3  0.436***  8.38  0.285***  5.60  0.247**  2.44  0.236**  2.32 
RISK4  0.470***  4.82  0.312***  3.44  0.307***  2.69  0.300***  2.72 
SCORE*RISK2  -0.156  -1.19  -0.143  -1.15  -0.226  -1.31  -0.211  -1.20 
SCORE*RISK3  -0.352***  -3.57  -0.260***  -2.82  -0.442***  -3.13  -0.428***  -3.05 
SCORE*RISK4  -0.390***  -2.72  -0.318**  -2.62  -0.550***  -3.42  -0.542***  -3.31 
        Bank Size and Loan Portfolio Health        
ln(GTA)  -0.158***  -3.52  -0.155***  -3.12  -0.053  -1.50  -0.048  -1.36 
NPL  -1.914  -1.02  -2.221  -1.03  -1.702  -0.68  -1.831  -0.73 
        Loan Contract Terms        
COLLAT  0.184***  4.13       -0.041  -0.74      
COMMIT  -0.264***  -3.36         -0.004  -0.02        
ln(CREDIT SIZE)  0.001  0.05         0.029  0.47        
                          
Adj. R-Squared  0. 160 0. 100   0. 029    0. 030    
N  3622      3622      2910      2910     
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Table III.  Test 1: The Effects of Risk on Debt Maturity  
The measured e ffects of loan risk on predicted loan maturity, evaluated at SCORE = 0 (not using the credit 
scoring technology) for each loan risk rating, holding the control variables at the sample mean.  Predicted 
maturities are based on the Table II regressions.  We i nclude a correction for the mean of the error on the 
assumption of normality (values are multiplied by exp(0.5*MSE
2)).  Rows (a) and (b) also show the difference in 
predicted maturities between low-risk loans (RISK1) and intermediate-risk loans (RISK2 and  RISK3, 
respectively).  Rows (c) and (d) show the difference in predicted maturities between high-risk loans (RISK4) and 
intermediate-risk loans (RISK2 and RISK3, respectively).  Significance at the 10 percent, five percent, and one 
percent levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.  Significance levels and t-statistics are based on the 
coefficients of the risk variables, as shown in Equation (2).   
Credits < $100K 






SCORE = 0 
Differences between Risk 





SCORE = 0 
Differences between Risk 
Ratings  t-stat 
(a)  RISK1  0.67  RISK1, RISK2  -0.69***  -3.27  (a)  RISK1  0.98  RISK1, RISK2  -0.54**  -2.29 
(b)  RISK2  1.36  RISK1, RISK3  -0.91***  -8.38  (b)  RISK2  1.52  RISK1, RISK3  -0.68***  -5.60 
(c)  RISK3  1.58  RISK4, RISK2  0.31   0.89  (c)  RISK3  1.65  RISK4, RISK2  0.24  0.54 
(d)  RISK4  1.67  RISK4, RISK3  0.09   0.33  (d)  RISK4  1.76  RISK4, RISK3  0.11   0.26 
                       
                           
Credits of $100K - $250K 






SCORE = 0 
Differences between Risk 





SCORE = 0 
Differences between Risk 
Ratings  t-stat 
(a)  RISK1  0.74  RISK1, RISK2  -0.27  -1.15  (a)  RISK1  0.76  RISK1, RISK2  -0.27  -1.10 
(b)  RISK2  1.01  RISK1, RISK3  -0.48**  -2.44  (b)  RISK2  1.03  RISK1, RISK3  -0.46**  -2.32 
(c)  RISK3  1.22  RISK4, RISK2  0.34  1.06  (c)  RISK3  1.22  RISK4, RISK2  0.34  0.48 
(d)  RISK4  1.35  RISK4, RISK3  0.13   0.32  (d)  RISK4  1.37  RISK4, RISK3  0.15   0.10 
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Table IV.  Test 2: The Effects of Reduced Informational Asymmetries  
from Small Business Credit Scoring on Debt Maturity 
The measured effects of credit scoring and loan risk on predicted loan maturity, evaluated at SCORE = 
0 (not using the credit scoring technology) and SCORE = 1 (using the credit scoring technology, but 
not to automatically approve/reject loans) for each loan risk rating, holding the control variables at the 
sample mean.  Predicted maturities are based on the Table II regressions.  We include a correction for 
the mean of the error on the assumption of normality (values are multiplied by exp(0.5*MSE
2)).  Rows 
(a), (b), (c), and (d) also show the difference in predicted maturity between SCORE = 1 and SCORE = 
0  for RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, and RISK4 loans, respectively.  Significance at the 10 percent, five 
percent, and one percent levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.  Significance levels and t-
statistics are based on the coefficients of the risk variables, as shown in Equation (3). 
      Credits < $100K 






SCORE = 0 
Predicted 
Maturity, 
SCORE = 1 







Difference  t-stat 
(a)  RISK1  0.67  1.14  0.48***  2.97  0.98  1.44  0.46**  2.26 
(b)  RISK2  1.36  1.59  0.23  0.69  1.52  1.62  0.10  0.17 
(c)  RISK3  1.58  1.33  -0.25   -0.97  1.65  1.48  -0.18  -0.77 
(d)  RISK4  1.67  1.32  -0.35   -0.95  1.76  1.40  -0.36   -1.15 
                   
                       
      Credits of $100K - $250K 






SCORE = 0 
Predicted 
Maturity, 
SCORE = 1 







Difference  t-stat 
(a)  RISK1  0.74  1.60  0.86***  3.05  0.76  1.56  0.80***  3.08 
(b)  RISK2  1.01  1.41  0.40   1.29  1.03  1.42  0.39   1.24 
(c)  RISK3  1.22  1.14  -0.08  -0.39  1.22  1.13  -0.09  -0.40 
(d)  RISK4  1.37  0.86  -0.51   -1.10  1.37  1.03  -0.34   -1.13 
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Table V. Risk Rating Regressions 
Logit regressions for the probability that the risk rating equals one ("minimal" risk loans) versus the probability 
that the risk rating equals two, three, or four ("low," "moderate," and "acceptable" loans, respectively).  Both 
samples combine loan observations from banks that do not use credit scoring technology (SCORE = 0) with 
loan observations from banks that use credit scoring technology but not to automatically approve/reject loans 
(SCORE = 1).  Regressions include ln(GTA), the natural log of gross total assets of the bank ($000);  NPL, the 
bank's ratio of nonperforming loans (past due 30 days or more days or nonaccrual) to total loans; COLLAT, a 
dummy that equals one if the loan is secured; COMMIT, a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is made 
under commitment; ln(CREDIT SIZE), the natural log of the maximum of the loan amount and the amount of 
commitment ($000), if any.  Regressions also include Q3 and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan 
was made.  Q2 is excluded as the base case (our sample includes the final three quarters of 1997).  Regressions 
for Credits of $100K - $250K exclude NPL, because the variable has an unreasonably large coefficient when it 
is included.  Significance at the 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels is denoted by *, **, and *** 
respectively. 
   Credits < $100K  Credits of $100K - $250K 
Variables:  Contract Terms  No Contract Terms  Contract Terms  No Contract Terms 
   Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept  11.372***  4.94  8.196 ***  4.31  -3.732  -1.00  3.170  1.38 
       Credit Scoring        
SCORE  0.093  0.41  -0.197   -0.94  0.113  0.40  0.035  0.13 
       Bank Size and Loan Portfolio Health        
ln(GTA)  -0.920***  -6.23  -0.708 ***  -5.70  -0.454***  -3.20  -0.417***  -2.97 
NPL  -1.879  -0.30  -5.066   -0.74               
       Loan Contract Terms        
COLLAT  1.458***  4.91        -0.140  -0.40      
COMMIT  -1.456***  -6.76         0.104  0.26        
ln(CREDIT SIZE)  -0.210**  -2.00         1.438**  2.44        
                         
Pseudo-R
2  0.132 0.050    0.035    0.022    
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Technical Appendix: The effects of reduced informational asymmetries on debt maturity 
In this appendix, we formalize our intuition regarding the effects of reduced informational 
asymmetries on debt maturity in Flannery’s and Diamond’s models.  For complete derivations of the 
models, see Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991).   
A. Flannery’s (1986) model 
We focus on the case in Flannery’s model in which positive transaction costs and asymmetric 
information are assumed.  These two assumptions create the possibility of the separating equilibrium that 
has received considerable attention in the literature and is the subject of our empirical tests.  Different 
equilibria predictions may arise when one or both of these assumptions are relaxed.
17  Here, we briefly 
show how the separating equilibrium arises, and then examine the effect of a reduction in informational 
asymmetries. 
At time t = 0, each firm needs an amount D to finance an investment project.  At both t = 1 and t 
= 2, the value of the project is reevaluated and upgraded with probability  p and downgraded with 
probability (1-p).  Firms default on debt only in the case of two consecutive downgrades – all other 
outcomes yield revenue sufficient to repay the loan.  Lenders charge default premiums on long term debt 
issued at t = 0 and on short-term debt issued following a downgrade at t = 1 to reflect the possibility of 
two consecutive downgrades.  Lenders do not charge default premiums on short-term debt issued at t = 0 
or on short-term debt issued following an upgrade at t = 1 because the lender cannot be subjected to a 
second consecutive downgrade on these contracts.  Every debt issue costs the firm a fixed transactions 
cost C > 0, so firms that issue long-term debt a t = 0 pay C, while firms that rollover successive short-term 
debt pay 2C. 
Each firm has either a good project or a bad project.  Both types of projects have positive net 
present values (NPVs) and positive probabilities of default.  They differ in their probabilities of being 
upgraded at t = 1 and t = 2, pg for good projects and pb for bad projects, with pg > pb.  At t = 0, lenders do 
not observe whether a firm’s project is good or bad, but do know pg, pb, and the proportion of firms with 
good projects.  At t = 1, lenders also learn whether each project was upgraded or downgraded. 
Long-term debt may default at t = 2, so lenders charge a default premium that reflects their 
estimate of expected loss, i.e., a premium that reflects average borrower risk.  As a result, firms with good  
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projects pay an excessive default premium relative to their expected losses, while firms with bad projects 
pay too small a premium relative to their expected losses.  The value of firm equity is therefore lower 
(higher) than it would otherwise be for firms with positive (negative) private information.  This 
“misinformation” value of equity for a long-maturity borrowing strategy is given by 
VL
mis(•) = (D - M) * [2(E(p) - p) + (p
2 - E(p
2))] / [2E(p) - E(p
2)].                             (A1) 
where (D-M) represents the lender’s realized loss in the case of two consecutive downgrades, E is the 
expectations operator conditional on the lender’s information, and p =  pg or pb for borrowers with good 
or bad projects, respectively.  The misinformation value for firms with good projects, denoted VL
mis(G), is 
negative since (E(p) - p) < 0, while the misinformation value for firms with bad projects,  VL
mis(B), is 
positive since (E(p) - p) > 0. 
Although short-term debt can not default at t = 1, if a downgrade is realized in the first period, 
then there is a nonzero probability of default on short-term debt that matures at t = 2.  Given a first period 
downgrade, firms with good projects who issue short-term debt will pay an excessive default premium in 
the second period while firms with bad projects will pay too small a premium.  The “misinformation” 
value of equity for a short-maturity borrowing strategy is given by 
VS
mis(•) =  (D - M) * [(1 - p)(E(p) - p + pE(p) - E(p
2))] / [ E(p) - E(p
2) ].                       (A2) 
The misinformation value for firms with good projects,  VS
mis(G), is again negative, while the 
misinformation value for firms with bad projects, VS
mis(B), is again positive based on the signs of (E(p) - 
p).  
If C  ‡  VS
mis(B), then firms with bad projects will issue long-term debt.  When this holds, firms 
with good projects choose short-term debt if the added cost of a rollover strategy is smaller than their 
(negative) misinformation value in the pooling equilibrium, i.e., if VL
mis(G) < - C, resulting in a separating 
equilibrium.  Thus, the borrowers’ contract choices reveal some of their private information, allowing the 
lender to reassess borrower risk and incorporate this information in the lender’s risk ratings in 
equilibrium, giving a positive relationship between debt maturity and the lender’s risk rating.  For 
purposes of empirical predictions across many lenders and borrowers, we generalize from the two discrete 
points in Flannery’s model to the monotonic upward-sloping relationship discussed in the text of the 
paper.  
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With these arrangements, we now consider the effect of a reduction in informational asymmetries 
in Flannery’s model.  We assume that at t = 0, the lender learns the private information of some fraction ? 
of firms with good projects and some fraction ? of firms with bad projects.  For the other borrowers that 
do not have their private information revealed, we assume that the conditions for the separating 
equilibrium hold, so that the upward-sloping relationship between debt maturity and lender risk ratings 
holds.  Under these assumptions, the fraction ? of firms with good projects and the fraction ? of firms with 
bad projects with no private information will all issue long-term debt to minimize transactions costs.  This 
occurs because E(p) = p, which implies VL
mis(G) = VS
mis(B) =  0, which in turn implies C ‡ VS
mis(B) and 
VL
mis(G) ‡ - C.  Combining the firms with and without private information, all firms with bad projects 
issue long-term debt (regardless of ?), whereas only the fraction ? of firms with good projects issue long-
term debt.  The new slope of the line depends on the value of ?.  If ? = 0, then there is no reduction in 
informational asymmetries for firms with good projects, and the slope is unchanged.  If ? = 1, then all 
private information regarding good projects is eliminated and the slope is zero.  For ? ˛ (0,1), the slope 
remains positive, but has a flatter slope.  Thus, in terms of empirical predictions, the reduction in 
informational asymmetries in Flannery’s model is expected to maintain the upward-sloping curve 
discussed in the text, but to raise the average maturity for all but the highest-risk borrowers. 
B. Diamond’s (1991) model 
Diamond’s model incorporates liquidity risk into a two-period framework similar to that in 
Flannery’s model.  At t = 0, firms need $1 to finance an investment project.  In an alternative investment 
available to investors, $1 invested at t = 0 returns R at t = 1 or R
2 if it is invested until t = 2.  Each firm has 
either a good project or a bad project.  Good projects return a cash flow of X > R
2 with certainty at t = 2, 
and have positive NPV.  Bad projects return a cash flow of X with probability p at t = 2, and return zero 
otherwise.  It is assumed that pX < R
2, and that all bad projects have negative NPV.  Each firm also 
receives the payoff C > 0 if it retains control of its project at t = 2, and all projects can be liquidated at t = 
1 for L.
18 
Firms have private information about whether their projects are good or b ad.  At  t = 0, the 
lenders’ information about the firm is restricted to the credit rating f, which represents the probability that 
the firm’s project is good given the available information.  For a credit rating f, a firm can receive funding  
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if lenders receive an expected return of  R per period.  The higher is the credit rating, the lower is the 
interest rate charged by the lender to cover default risk.  During the first period, each project receives 
either an upgrade or a downgrade.  Lenders observe this performance at t = 1, and revise the credit rating 
accordingly.  Denote the revised credit rating conditional on an upgrade (downgrade) as fu (fd), such that fu 
> f > fd.  All bad projects are downgraded.  This normalizes fu at 1, since all projects upgraded are known 
to be good.  Good projects are downgraded with probability e, such that e = [ fd( 1 - f)]/[f(1 - fd)] by 
Bayes’s Law.   
From these conditions, one can derive that for sufficiently high credit ratings of f ˛ (S,1], firms 
with good projects prefer short-term debt to long-term debt, with the lower limit S given by  
S = {p[R
2 - LR + fd (C + X - R
2 )]} / {(1 - p) (LR -  f d (C + X )}.
19                           (A3) 
The underlying intuition is simple.  For firms with good projects, the probability of downgrade, e = [fd( 1 - 
f)]/[f(1 - fd)], is decreasing in f.  For sufficiently high f (f > S), firms are willing to accept the relatively low 
liquidity risk of liquidation following a downgrade, because of the relatively high probability of an 
upgrade that will give them a low interest rate at t = 1.  Firms with bad projects and high credit ratings 
would also choose short maturity  – mirroring the choices of firms with good projects with their same 
credit rating – to avoid revealing that they have negative NPV projects, which would be denied credit. 
In the model, firm preferences for long-term debt may not always be feasible.  A firm with a 
given credit rating f can issue long-term debt as long as lenders receive an expected return of R
2.  The 
expected return meets this criterion if and only if the credit rating is sufficiently high, i.e., f > [R
2 - pX]/[1 
- p].  If lenders can obtain sufficiently high returns from liquidation given a downgrade at t =1, then short-
term debt is feasible for firms with f > [Xf d + R
2(1 - fd) - LR]/[X-LR] even when long-term debt is not.
20 
This constraint imposed on high-risk firms completes the relationship between firm risk and debt 
maturity: high-risk firms (f ˛ ( [Xf d + R
2(1 - fd) - LR]/[X-LR] , [R
2 - pX]/[1 - p] ]) and low-risk firms (f ˛  ( 
S , 1 ]) issue short-term debt, while intermediate-risk firms (f ˛ ( [R
2 - pX]/[1 - p] , S ]) issue long-term 
term debt.
21  For purposes of empirical predictions across many lenders and borrowers, we generalize 
from the two maturity lengths and discontinuous jumps at different levels of risk rating in Diamond’s 
model to the nonmonotonic curve discussed in the text of the paper.  
Given these specifications, we next consider the effect of a reduction in informational  
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asymmetries in Diamond’s model.  Suppose there are n firms, divided evenly among low-, intermediate-, 
and high-risk credit ratings, and again divided evenly between those with good and bad projects.  That is, 
there are n/6 low-risk firms with good projects, n/6 low-risk firms with bad projects, and so on. 
To model a reduction in asymmetric information, assume that lenders learn the private 
information of some fraction ? of firms, evenly distributed across the credit ratings and between good and 
bad projects.  The (1 - ?)n firms with unrevealed private information operate within the context of the 
model as above.  Among these firms, (1  -  ?)n/3 high-risk firms issue short-term debt, (1  - ? )n/3 
intermediate-risk firms issue long-term debt, and (1 - ?)n/3 low-risk firms issue short-term debt. 
The ?n firms that no longer have private information face different lending constraints.  The ?n/2 
firms revealed to have good projects are all evaluated as low-risk and should be indifferent to short- and 
long-term debt because there is no longer any liquidity risk and transactions costs are not present in 
Diamond’s model.  We assume that some fraction ? of these ?n/2 firms choose long-term debt and the 
fraction (1 – ?) choose short-term debt.  The other ?n/2 firms that are revealed to have bad projects do not 
receive financing because bad projects have negative NPV. 
Combining the firms with and without private information, there is a change in average maturity 
for low-risk borrowers from the Diamond model in which all firms have private information.  A total of 
(1 – ?)n/3 + (1 – ?) ?n/2 of the low-risk firms issue short-term debt, and ??n/2 of them issue long-term 
debt.  There is no change for high-risk and intermediate-risk borrowers, other than there are fewer of 
them.  All (1 - ?)n/3 high-risk firms issue short-term debt and all (1 - ?)n/3 intermediate-risk firms issue 
long-term debt.  Thus, in terms of empirical predictions, the reduction in informational asymmetries in 
Diamond’s model is expected to maintain the general nonmonotonic curve discussed in the text, but to 
raise the average maturity for the low-risk borrowers. 
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1 For convenience, we refer in this paper to firms or loans with low and high risk ratings as ‘low-risk’ and 
‘high-risk’ firms or loans, although the risk ratings may not always correspond to underlying risk of the 
firms or loans.  
 
2 Barclay and Smith (1995, p. 629) make a similar point. 
 
3 We test each of these coefficient sums separately, rather than the joint test (H0: b1 = d2 = d3 = d4 = 0), 
because our focus is on the changes in maturity in each of the risk ratings from a reduction in 
informational asymmetries, rather than the general effect across the risk ratings. 
 
4 The d2 and d3 coefficients must be negative so that the increases in maturity for intermediate-risk firms 
(b1 + d2 and b1 + d3) are less than the increase for the low-risk firms (b1). 
 
5 Two banks that respond to both surveys are eliminated because they do not report risk ratings. 
 
6 We exclude fixed-rate loans (less than 2% of the observations) to construct a more homogenous sample. 
 
7 It is theoretically possible that the banks adopting SBCS were those that tended to have worse loan 
quality, and hence even after implementing SBCS have more information asymmetry than their 
competitors.  However, some of the other research using the SBCS data suggest that this is not the case.  
Investigations of the SBCS adoption decision find that it is unrelated to the bank’s prior commercial loan 
charge-off ratio (Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001)) and to the bank’s prior ratio of small business 
lending to assets (Berger, Frame, and Miller (forthcoming)). 
 
8 The STBL instructions relate the rating of 1 with AA-rated corporate bonds and the rating of 2 with 
BBB corporate bonds.  It is more difficult to provide a bond equivalent for ratings of 3 and 4.  We 
exclude loans rated 5, “special mention or classified asset,” because they are more likely renewals of 
problem loans rather than new, independent loans.  We also exclude loans from banks that did not report 
comparable loan ratings. 
 
9 Extant research suggests that these ratings provide a reasonable ordinal ranking of risks, but are far from 
perfect.  Berger (2004) shows that higher risk ratings are generally associated with higher interest rate 
premiums (e.g., premiums of about 35 basis points more for RISK2 loans than RISK1 loans), but that 
some institutions may have problems translating their own ratings into the STBL categories.  Morgan and 
Ashcroft (2003) find that the STBL risk ratings help predict future CAMEL downgrades as expected, but 
do not add much information to loan interest rates in predicting future nonperforming loans. 
 
10 We do not include bank fixed effects because they would be almost perfectly correlated with the 
SCORE variable.  Only 2 of the 53 banks adopted SBCS during the sample period – the other 51 either 
have SCORE = 0 or SCORE = 1 for all observations. 
 
11 Prior research offers empirical evidence that contract terms are endogenous based on a sample of 
revolving bank loans to large firms (Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000)).  These authors provide a 
structural model that incorporates a number of firm-level characteristics, which allows them to identify 
the system and construct instrumental variables.  Unfortunately, our data has no firm-specific information 
that would allow for such an approach.  
 
12 We use the Huber-White sandwich estimator to compute standard errors (Huber (1967), White (1982)).  
Independence is relaxed for loan observations from the same bank, but maintained for loan observations  
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from different banks.  The results are materially unchanged when we use random effects or the standard 
White correction instead of clustering. 
 
13 For purposes of comparability, we also reran Test 1 for the credits < $100K and credits of $100K-
$250K deleting the SCORE variable and interactions.  The deletion of SCORE and interactions in effect 
removes our  distinction between firms that are likely to have greater versus lesser informational 
asymmetries (SCORE = 0 versus SCORE = 1) within the pool of firms in a given credit size sample.  We 
found the results for low-risk firms to be robust for the credits < $100K, but statistical significance was 
lost for the credits of $100K-$250K.  Again, this is consistent with the hypothesis that the informational 
opacity problems are greater for smaller credits, although the distinction is less sharp without the use of 
the SCORE variable. 
 
14 Most of the theoretical research on collateral suggests that safer firms tend to pledge collateral to signal 
their quality (e.g., Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985)), but most of the empirical literature finds that 
riskier firms tend to pledge collateral more often (e.g., Berger and Udell (1990)).  These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms rated as riskiest may not be offered a credit alternative without 
collateral requirements, similar to Diamond’s argument for firms rated as high-risk.  Similarly, 
commitment contracts may help banks resolve information problems by offering various sets of contract 
terms – up-front fees, usage fees, unused line charges, interest rates, and so forth – that induce firms to 
reveal their types or to choose higher net present value projects (e.g., Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987), 
Berkovitch and Greenbaum (1991)).  
 
15 In most cases, the coefficient estimates are similar, but statistical significance declines as the estimated 
standard errors are higher.  To check whether this was due primarily to the reduction in degrees of 
freedom, we note that under the standard classical assumptions of i.i.d. random errors, reducing the 
sample size should increase the standard errors at the rate (n-k)
1/2, where n-k is the degrees of freedom 
(subsample size n minus number of regressors k).  We found that the estimated standard errors for the 
subsamples generally increased at approximately this rate.  For example, the estimated standard error on 
RISK2 is 0.225 in the COLLAT = 0 subsample for credits < $100K, and takes the value 0.103 in the full 
sample, creating a ratio of 0.225/0.103 = 2.18.  This ratio is close to what would be predicted by the ratio 
of the square roots of degrees of freedom as the subsample size is reduced from 3622 to 1016, with 11 
regressors, or [(3622-11)/(1016-11)]
1/2 = 1.92. 
 
16 We also attempt to deal with this potential endogeneity with a Heckman correction, using banks’ past 
small business loans/GTA ratio as the instrument.  However, this instrument does not have a significant 
effect on the probability of adopting SBCS in the first-stage regression, making the results unreliable. 
 
17 If neither transaction costs nor asymmetric information are present, then firms operating u nder 
Flannery’s framework are indifferent to short- and long-term debt, leading to an indeterminacy of 
equilibrium.  If asymmetric information is present but transaction costs are not, the result is a pooling 
equilibrium in which all firms issue short-term debt. 
 
18 Liquidation can be interpreted to include situations in which a firm loses control of its project at t = 1 
and the lender attempts to capture maximum repayment. 
 
19 The equality holds for liquidation  L that is not efficient: L  ˛ ([p + fd(1-p)]X/R, [(p + fd(1-p))X + 
fdC]/R).  When L is efficient enough, all good project borrowers will issue short-term debt. 
 
20 The condition that must hold is L > [p + fd(1-p)]X/R. 
 
21 Firms with extremely poor credit ratings (f ˛ [ 0, [Xfd + R
2(1 - fd) - LR]/[X-LR] ]) do not receive credit. 